September 11, 2004

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  Alan Turing

  
  

  The Turing Test

  
  

  If computers can be constructed to think as intelligently as humans, then it is possible that our thinking operates mechanically and that we are part of the physical, causal world. It remains a practical matter about what stuff can realise the algorithms. Silicone chips can do so; biological brains too – but maybe they do much more in human thinking? After all, machine intelligence seems contradictory, for we contrast mechanical with intelligent behaviour. To deal with this, Alan Turing devised a discriminatory test – The Turing Test.

  
  

  An interrogator, receiving only printed answers, interrogates two hidden individuals, one intelligent human, one machine. If he cannot tell which is the machine, then the machine is intelligent. Of course, the interrogator needs intelligence himself. Asking simple arithmetical questions alone, for example, would lead to no difference being identified between persons and pocket calculators with suitable interfaces. Further, the machines need to be intelligently programmed to avoid tell-tale signs of their non-human nature: so, they can, for example, delay answers to complex questions, print out hesitant "er"s and even make mistakes.

  
  

   

  
  

  

  
  

  The Enigma Machine

  
  

   

  
  

  Even if machines pass Turing’s test (some have, but were their interrogators sufficiently discerning?) they might be merely simulating or modelling. After all, computers can model weather changes, but there’s no danger of computers raining. In contrast, simulating steps of reasoning to right answers, with right answers given – as also, sometimes, acting sex scenes in films – amounts to the real thing. So, are machines that pass Turing’s test akin to weather modelling or to realistic sex acting?

  
  

  The Turing Test hides seeming irrelevancies, such as whether the "thinker" is metallic or flesh; but it hides much more. Our thinking engages a fleshy life – riding bicycles, coaxing lovers who have headaches, using chairs as coat-hangers. Simply knowing that something or other, about bicycles, coat-hangers and lovers, captures neither our thoughts’ richness concerning these items, nor our knowing how to use them, nor how to judge what is relevant to say about them.

  
  

  

  
  

  Computation, however, is symbol manipulation – symbols that we interpret as meaningful. Can we even grasp how sheer computational complexity could give rise to interpreting symbols – to understanding their meaning?

  
  

  -Peter Cave,  http://www.philosophersmag.com/article.php?id=730

  
  

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  How do I know that you are a real person and not some Xanga program? Please comment with proof.

  
  

   

  • 4:03 am
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